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Abstract
I introduce a new learning-to-forecast experimental design, where subjects in a virtual
New-Keynesian macroeconomy based on Woodford (2013) need to forecast individual in-
stead of aggregate outcomes. This approach is motivated by the critique of Preston (2005)
and Woodford (2013) that substituting arbitrary forms of expectations into the reduced-form
New-Keynesian model (consisting of the “DIS” equation, the “Phillips curve” and the “Tay-
lor” rule) is inconsistent with its microfoundations. Using this design, I analyze the impact
of di↵erent interest rate rules on expectation formation and expectation-driven fluctuations.
Even if the Taylor principle is fulfilled, instead of quickly converging to the REE, the exper-
imental economy exhibits persistent purely expectation-driven fluctuations not necessarily
around the REE. Only a particularly aggressive monetary authority achieves the elimination
of these fluctuations and quick convergence to the REE. To explain the aggregate behavior
in the experiment, I develop a “noisy” adaptive learning approach, introducing endogenous
shocks into a simple adaptive learning model. However, I find that for some monetary pol-
icy regimes a reinforcement learning model, applied to di↵erent forecasting rules, provides a
better fit to the data.
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1 Introduction
This paper introduces a new experimental design based on the structural form of the New-
Keynesian model in Woodford (2013) to analyze the impact of di↵erent interest rate rules on
expectation formation and in particular expectation-driven fluctuations. The data on expectations
obtained from the laboratory are subsequently used to extend previous approaches of modeling
expectations.
The fact that interest rate setting by central banks can be described by simple rules is well
documented by a large empirical literature following Taylor (1993). The validity of policy recom-
mendations regarding interest rate rules crucially depends on how agents form their expectations
regarding future economic conditions. The standard approach of modeling expectations as model-
consistent or rational expectations can be considered as unnecessarily strong, as this presumes
a correct understanding of the model, knowledge of all parameters and common knowledge of
rationality, i.e. that all agents know that all other agents are rational. The central policy rec-
ommendation for the design of interest rate rules both under rational expectations and in the
macroeconomic learning literature is considered to be the ”Taylor principle”, implying that in-
terest rates should actively respond to inflation. Under rational expectations, the reason for
the desirability of the Taylor principle is that in New-Keynesian frameworks it guarantees local
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and thus avoids the emergence of
multiplicity.
A weak requirement for the adoption of rational expectations is often whether agents at least
asymptotically learn how to form model-consistent or rational expectations. (see e.g. Bullard and
Mitra (2002); Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006), Marimon and Sunder (1994)) A theoretical
learning literature addresses this question using particular hypotheses regarding the process of ex-
pectation formation. One assumption that is frequently made is that agents in the model behave
like econometricians. (Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Sargent, 1994; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) In
the context of a New-Keynesian model, Bullard and Mitra (2002) investigate stability under least
square learning (E-stability1) of the REE based on the reduced-form equations, i.e. the “dynamic
IS” equation, the “Phillips curve” and the interest rate rule. They find that the Taylor principle is
necessary and su cient for E-stablity. This finding has, however, already been questioned by the
1Marcet and Sargent (1989) show a one-to-one correspondence between E-stability and learnability under least
square learning.
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adaptive learning literature, since Orphanides and Williams (2007) recommend a more aggressive
monetary policy in the presence of learning, if agents’ misperceptions of the economy’s steady
state levels are taken into account.
Yet, since the theoretical learning literature relies on particular assumptions regarding agents’
expectation formation behavior, a complementary experimental literature2 has developed. On
the one hand, this literature investigates the nature of belief formation empirically and, on the
other hand, for this observed behavior it tests the robustness of policy recommendations derived
under rational expectations or other hypothesized forms of expectation formation. In this type
of experiment, subjects act as forecasters in virtual markets or economies in which outcomes are
generated by the computer conditional on subjects’ beliefs. This methodology is adopted due to
several distinct advantages. As opposed to real macroeconomic time series where the REE cannot
easily be observed, in the laboratory the REE is controlled by the experimenter, which enables
to easily examine whether learning dynamics converge to the REE. Secondly, surveyed inflation
expectations depend on many uncontrollable factors so that it can be immensely challenging to
isolate and identify the e↵ect of monetary policy. Thirdly, in the laboratory the experimenter can
incentivize subjects by paying them according to their forecasting performance, while respondents
in surveys do not have any incentive to accurately contemplate about their beliefs.
The experimental test about monetary policy in a reduced-form New-Keynesian model has been
delivered by Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al. (2014). Using the reduced-form equa-
tions, both corroborate the theoretical literature that relies on least square learning and find
convergence to the REE under satisfaction of the Taylor principle, while without satisfying the
Taylor principle non-convergence patterns and high fluctuations are observable.3
Yet, Bullard and Mitra (2002), Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al. (2014) are subject
to the criticism that substituting any arbitrary form of expectation formation into the reduced-
form equations of the New-Keynesian model is inconsistent with the microfoundations that model.
Preston (2005) shows that the “dynamic IS” equation and the “Phillips curve” follow from the
infinite-horizon optimality conditions under the law of iterated expectations. Preston thus anal-
yses E-stability under infinite horizon learning with a representative agent constructing forecasts
of aggregate variables infinitely far into the future using least squares coe cients of the regression
2Laboratory experiments are an increasingly popular methodology to study questions related to macroeconomics.
See Du↵y (2014) for a survey.
3Arifovic and Petersen (2015) use a similar design to examine policies to escape expectation-driven liquidity
traps.
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on the MSV-solution variables. Surprisingly, he finds that the necessary and su cient condition
for E-stability is the same as in Bullard and Mitra (2002), i.e. satisfaction of the Taylor principle.
Furthermore, Woodford (2013) and Honkapohja et al. (2013) note that the derivations of these
equations follow under homogeneous beliefs.4
Hence, I introduce a new, internally consistent learning-to-forecast experimental design based on
the structural-form of the heterogeneous expectations New-Keynesian framework in Woodford
(2013), so that the experimental setup is solely based on first-order conditions of agents’ opti-
mization problems into which arbitrary expectations can be substituted. The design is without
any exogenous shocks so that all shocks in the experiment come from agents’ expectations. My
experimental results di↵er from the experiments of Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al.
(2014) and are more congruent with the theoretical results of Orphanides and Williams (2007)
and Ferrero (2007), as I do not find evidence that Taylor-rule reaction coe cients outside the
unit circle guarantee learning dynamics converging to the REE in a structural New-Keynesian
model. If the Taylor principle is barely satisfied, I instead find persistent fluctuations not nec-
essarily around the steady state. Since in the absence of exogenous shocks all fluctuations are
purely expectation-driven, it is desirable to eliminate these and ensure convergence. To do so,
my results and the subsequently developed “noisy” adaptive model suggest that the monetary
authority needs to adopt a reinforced Taylor principle reacting more strongly to deviations of
inflation from the desired level, with a reaction coe cient on inflation around 3.
To understand the di↵erences observed in the experimental economies under di↵erent Taylor rules,
I consider two general approaches to modeling learning: The first approach is using a model with
few free parameters to explain the aggregate behavior in the experiment, while the second ap-
proach is considering a more sophisticated model to replicate aggregate and individual behavior. I
conduct agent-based computational economic (ACE) path simulations to investigate whether the
dynamics as observed in the experiments are predicted by di↵erent learning models.
The starting point for the first approach, i.e. modeling aggregate behavior, is exploring a fre-
quently assumed hypothesis in the macroeconomic learning literature proposed by Marcet and
Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), postulating that agents’ forecasting behavior
resembles an econometrician. While subjects certainly do not literally apply econometric tech-
4Although these papers merely note that homogeneity is a su cient condition for deriving the reduced-form
equations, studies like Branch and McGough (2009) and Kurz et al. (2013) that derive the reduced-form New-
Keynesian equations under diverse beliefs rely on other strong behavioral assumptions on the expectations operator,
whose empirical validity raises questions.
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niques, this learning rule can alternatively be interpreted as agents adjusting their forecasts in the
direction of the last observed forecast error and attaching decreasing weight to new observations.
This is the intuition why least square learning can be considered a special case of adaptive learn-
ing. (Sargent (1994) for details) I also consider an alternative case of adaptive learning, which is
constant gain learning, meaning that agents discount past observations. While least square learn-
ing and constant gain learning are successful in qualitatively predicting the di↵erences between
active but less aggressive monetary policy and particularly aggressive monetary policy, they do
not predict the fluctuations observed in the experiments.
A combination of the macroeconomic and the microeconomic learning literature, which I call noisy
adaptive learning, improves the fit to the experimental data and accurately predicts the di↵erence
in the convergence patterns: I take an adaptive specification with constant gain, into which I in-
troduce idiosyncratic cognitive shocks in the learning process similarly to some applications in the
microeconomic learning literature. (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Binmore et al., 1995; Nagel and
Vriend, 1999; Anderson et al., 2004) A novel feature is that the shock variance is endogenous with
a specification similar to the ones used for conditional heteroskedasticity models in the financial
econometrics literature. (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986).
Following the second approach, i.e. to fit both aggregate and individual behavior, I consider the
hypothesis by Brock and Hommes (1997) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012a), where agents choose
among a finite set of possible forecasting models with endogenous probabilities of using each model.
I find that the functional form for the switching probabilities of the reinforcement model by Roth
and Erev (1998) provides a better fit to the data than the one specified by Brock and Hommes
(1997) or Anufriev and Hommes (2012a). The reason is the assumption by Brock and Hommes
(1997) that agents consider fictitious play, i.e. the ceteris-paribus payo↵ for forecasting rules that
were not used, which is dubious in the context of my experiment, where agents’ own forecasts
have a relatively large influence on individual market outcomes.
2 Model
One former approach has been to implement complete structural versions of the New-Keynesian
model in the laboratory (see e.g. Petersen (2012)), where subjects assume the roles of households
and firms and make similar decisions to agents in the model such as production, consumption and
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labor supply decisions. Yet, in such a framework, it is challenging to isolate the role of expecta-
tions.
Once narrowing the set of possible experimental designs to “learning-to-forecast” experiments,
an approach could be implementing a nonlinear version of the New-Keynesian model so that the
dynamics can be obtained as being consistent with exact optimization behavior of individuals
independently of the size of the expectational error. Hommes et al. (2015) introduce a non-linear
New-Keynesian model into the laboratory. However, their setup is simplified, since the only input
obtained from subjects are point forecasts. Since the variables that are to be forecast are not
independent, determining behavior in a non-linear model does not only require conditional means
of future variables but also other moments of the conditional distribution so that in fact a more
complex description of subjects’ probability beliefs would be needed.
Hence, I take a di↵erent approach and base my experiment on the linearized heterogeneous expec-
tations New-Keynesian model by Woodford (2013). The important di↵erence to Preston (2005)
is that this model departs from the representative agent. Expectations represent a well-behaved
probability measure, but can be heterogeneous across agents and need not necessarily be model-
consistent. For the experiment, I only make minimal changes from Woodford (2013):
• Although Woodford (2013) presents the model with an exogenous preference shock and a
markup shock, in the model used for the experiment there will be no exogenous shocks, since
individual behavior deviating from the rational expectations outcome already introduces
shocks into the system. Since the MSV solution of the model is thus a constant, it will
create an easier learning environment for agents.
• While Woodford (2013) considers a log-linearized model around a zero inflation steady state,
I consider a model of full price indexation as first used by Yun (1996), i.e. in the periods
between price re-optimizations firms mechanically adjust their prices according to steady
state inflation ⇡¯. There are several reasons for adopting an interest rate steady state above
zero: firstly, most central banks target a medium-run inflation above zero. Secondly, assum-
ing that subjects start with a random guess, zero would be the expected initial outcome.
Since zero thus seems a natural choice for a starting value, it is convenient to specify the
equilibrium of one group to be non-zero. Thirdly, a non-zero inflation steady state provides
additional margin to prevent interest rates from attaining the zero lower bound.
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The model is presented in more detail in Woodford (2013) and Appendix 9.1. Below an abridged
version.
2.1 The demand side
This cashless economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by i, seeking to maxi-




 T t[U(C iT ) ⌥(hiT (j))] (1)
where C it is a composite consumption good and Eˆ
i
t is an arbitrary subjective (not necessarily
rational) expectations operator of household i given the information set in period t, which however





i(j) is the amount of
labor supplied by household i for the production of good j. The second term in the brackets is
to be interpreted as the total disutility of labor supply. There is an equal number of households
supplying labor for each type of good.5
Woodford (2013) introduces a union negotiating the wage on behalf of all households so that the
household has no choice but supplying the hours of work demanded by the firm at the given wage.
Thus, a household only has to decide on its (real) consumption expenditure, C it . There is one
single riskless one-period bond in the economy whose holdings in a period t by household i can
be denoted Bit. One main di↵erence of this heterogeneous agent model to the representative agent
model is that households can have non-zero asset holdings. A log-linearised approximation to the
consumption function takes the form:
cˆit = (1   )bˆit +
1X
T=t
 T tEˆit{(1   )(YˆT   ⌧ˆT )    (ˆiT   ⇡ˆT+1) + (1   )sb(  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )} (2)
where the -ˆsuperscripts denote log-deviation from steady state, bt the value of the maturing bond
holdings deflated by the price level at period t  1, Y aggregate output, ⌧ the level of lump sum
taxes deflated by the current period price level, i the nominal interest rate set by the central bank,
⇡ the current level of inflation and sb the steady-state level of government debt divided by the
steady state level of output. (2) can be rewritten in its recursive form under internally consistent
5Woodford (2003, p. 144↵.) shows that under this assumption, this is equivalent to a representative agent
supplying labor for each type of good.
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expectations of the household as





 T tEˆit{(1   )(YˆT   ⌧ˆT )  [    (1   )sb](  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )} (4)
I adopt this notation from Woodford (2013), since the advantage is that individuals only need
to forecast a single variable. Using the goods market clearing condition Yˆt =
R
cˆitdi, aggregate
demand can be obtained as
Yˆt = (1   )bˆt + vt    ⇡ˆt (5)
Woodford (2013) assumes for simplicity that government expenditure is an exogenous disturbance,
but, since I introduce the model into the laboratory without any shocks, in my setup, the govern-
ment merely uses the taxes to service the debt it has accumulated. Hence, the government’s flow
budget constraint is given as
bˆt+1 =  
 1[bˆt   sb⇡ˆt   ⌧ˆt] + sbiˆt (6)
(4) implies the recursive form
vit = (1   )vt +  (1   )(bˆt+1   bˆt)    (ˆit   ⇡ˆt) +  Eˆitvit+1 (7)
where vt =
R
vitdi is the average value across agents of the expectational variable defined in (4).






 T t[⌧ˆT   sb(  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )] (8)
This is a strong assumption. However, it simplifies the model considerably and this assumption
is frequently made in non-RE analyses. (See Woodford (2013) for a detailed discussion.) In the
context of this experiment, this can be interpreted as the computerized household understanding
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that government cannot forever accumulate debt. Under this assumption, aggregate demand is
independent of the supply of public debt and can be more compactly written as
Yˆt = v¯t    ⇡ˆt (9)
where v¯t = vt + (1    )bˆt is the aggregate of a subjective variable v¯it, which is the variable that
one group of subjects, labeled as “household advisors”, needs to forecast in the experiment, and




Eˆit{(1   )YˆT    ( iT   ⇡T )} (10)
(10) together with (2) and (4) imply
v¯it = cˆ
i
t +  ⇡ˆt   (1   )(bit   bt) (11)
The model was log-linearized near a steady-state in which all households have the same level of
bond holdings, so that bit   bt is small by assumption. Since this term is additionally multiplied
by a small factor 1   , the following approximate relationship holds
v¯it ⇡ cˆit +  ⇡ˆt (12)
As cit represents real expenditure, nominal expenditure can be written (in log deviation) as cˆ
i
t+pt.
To make the variable stationary (as there will be a unit root in the price level in equilibrium), one
can define a real measure of expenditure in terms of the previous period price level pt 1 as
cˆit + pt   pt 1 (13)
Since   = 1, (13) is equal to
cˆit +  (pt   pt 1| {z }
=⇡ˆt
) ⇡ v¯it (14)
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so that v¯it is close to real expenditure. Likewise (9) implies
v¯t = Yˆt +  ⇡ˆt (15)
so that the aggregate of v¯it is likewise closely related to the real output gap (expressed in terms of
the price level in period t  1.)
(10) is consistent with a recursive form of
v¯it = (1   )v¯t     (ˆit   ⇡ˆt) +  Eˆit v¯it+1 (16)
which is the data-generating process in the experiment.
The computerized central bank is specified as to adopting a Taylor rule only reacting to the
deviation of inflation from its steady state. However, interest rates cannot fall below zero so that:
it = max(0, i¯+  ⇡(⇡t   ⇡¯)) (17)
2.2 The supply side
Woodford (2013) assumes Calvo (1983) price-setting such that a fraction 0 < ↵ < 1 of goods
prices are exogenously held fixed in any period. Producers engage in Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition, which means that each firm sets the price for a good that it alone produces. Under
full price indexation, the log-linearized approximation of the inflation dynamics is given by
⇡ˆt = (1  ↵)pˆ⇤t (18)
where, for each firm j that is chosen to re-optimize its price in period t, p⇤jt is the amount by which
the firm would choose to set the log price of its good higher than pt 1. p⇤t =
R
p⇤jt dj is the average
value of this variable across all firms that are chosen by the Calvo mechanism to reoptimize prices
in period t. The solution to firm j’s maximization problem takes the form:
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵ )
1X
T=t
(↵ )T tEˆjt {poptT   pt 1   (T   t+ 1)⇡¯} (19)
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where poptT is the single-period optimal log price, being the same for each firm, as they face the
same labor market and aggregate conditions. Using the law of iterated expectations, one can
rewrite (19) in its recursive form:
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵ )(poptt   pt 1   ⇡¯) + ↵ (Eˆjt pˆ⇤jt+1 + ⇡ˆt) (20)
Suppose that the union, setting the wage on behalf of the households, pursues the objective that
at that wage, a marginal increase in labor demand would neither increase nor decrease average
perceived utility across households, if for each household the marginal utility of additional wage
income is weighted against the marginal disutility of additional work. Hence, the optimality







By log-linearising (21), one obtains
!ˆt = #ˆt   uˆc,t (22)
where !t is the log real wage, #t is the log of the (common) marginal disutility of labor and uc,t
is the (log) aggregate marginal utility of additional real income across households. Hence
!ˆt = #ˆt +  
 1cˆt = #ˆt +   1Yˆt (23)
Given that mˆct = !ˆt   mˆpnt and since both #ˆt and mˆpnt can be expressed as functions of labor
hours and thus as output (which is determined by the market clearing condition for the aggregate
goods market), one can summarize poptt as
poptt = pt + ⇠Yˆt (24)








it is easy to see that ⇠ ⌘   1 + '. We obtain, by using (24) in (20):
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵)pˆ⇤t + (1  ↵ )⇠Yˆt + ↵ Eˆjt pˆ⇤jt+1 (26)
2.3 From the structural to the textbook reduced form
Only under the hypothesis that all expectations are identical, subjective expectations {Eˆit} and
{Eˆjt } can be replaced by the single expectations operator Eˆt and the system reduces to
v¯t =   (it   ⇡t) + Eˆtv¯t+1 (27)
⇡t = Yˆt +  Eˆt⇡t+1 (28)
where  ⌘ (1 ↵)(1 ↵ )↵ ⇠. This represents a reduced-form system similar to the ones in Woodford
(2003), Gal´ı (2008) or Walsh (2010), which has been used in the experiments by Pfajfar and Zˇakelj
(2014) and by Assenza et al. (2014).
2.4 System
By integrating (7) over i and (26) over j and by inserting the resulting equations back into (7) and



























with ⌦ ⌘ 1↵+ ⇡ ⇠(1 ↵)(1 ↵ ) and
b ⌘
266666664
(1  ↵)↵  ( ⇡   1)
(1   ) +  ⇡ ⇠(1  ↵)(1  ↵ )
↵  ( ⇡   1)(1  ↵)



















  0.99 implies quarterly risk-free real rate of 0.01
 0.3
↵ 0.67 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
⇠ 1.76 consistency with  ⌘ (1 ↵)(1 ↵ )↵ ⇠ = 0.3
  1 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
⇡¯ 2 commonly chosen inflation target
Table 1: Calibration
I use the same calibration as Clarida et al. (2000) with   = 1,  = 0.3 and   = 0.99. I set
⇡¯ = 2, since this is a commonly chosen inflation target by central banks. For the structural form,
I need to specify two more parameters. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), I specify
↵ = 0.66, which implies ⇠ = 1.76 to be consistent with  = 0.3.
With this calibration, the coe cient matrices become6
Structural-form system with  ⇡ = 0.5
A ⇡=0.5 =
266666664
1.1304 0.1435 0 0
0.7826 0.8609 0 0
0.1404 0.1435 0.99 0
0.7826 0.2009 0 0.66
377777775 (32)
6The systems are shown for the case where the zero lower bound is not binding.
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Structural-form system with  ⇡ = 1.5
A ⇡=1.5 =
266666664
0.8966  0.1138 0 0
0.6207 0.6828 0 0
 0.0934  0.1138 0.99 0
0.6207 0.0228 0 0.66
377777775 (33)
Structural-form system with  ⇡ = 3
A ⇡=3 =
266666664
0.6842  0.3474 0 0
0.4737 0.5211 0 0
 0.3058  0.3474 0.99 0
0.4737  0.1389 0 0.66
377777775 (34)
2.6 Discussion of the di↵erent systems
The linear systems imply a unique rational expectations steady state with v¯i = v¯ = 0 and
p⇤j = p⇤ = ⇡¯ = 2. For the REE to be determinate, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix A need
to lie inside the unit circle. (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) If monetary policy conforms with the
Taylor principle and the ZLB is not binding, the absolute values of all eigenvalues of coe cient
matrix A in systems (33) and (34) lie within the unit circle. However, if agents do not know the
underlying model but have to learn the coe cients, they implicitly also need to learn the eigenval-
ues of the system. Hence, it could be that through misperceptions, the perceived law of motion of
agents has eigenvalues outside the unit circle and thus exhibits explosive or fluctuating behavior.
Assenza et al. (2014, p.30) note that, in the reduced-form system, where both eigenvalues depend
on the reaction coe cient  ⇡, the perceived law of motion can potentially be rendered stationary
by reacting more strongly to inflation, as this can push the eigenvalue su ciently far away from
the unit circle.
Yet, this conclusion becomes questionable, if one considers the structural-form systems (33) and
(34) under active monetary policy, whose Jacobian matrix, A, has two eigenvalues that do not
depend on  ⇡, but which are constants equal to ↵  and  . Since ↵ and   are constants within the
unit circle under a standard calibration, one does not have an indeterminacy problem of the equi-
librium under rational expectations. Yet, if individuals have to learn the coe cients, especially
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  = 0.99, implying near-unit root behavior, a problem arises, since even very small misperceptions
by individuals might give rise to a perceived law of motion that has an eigenvalue outside the unit
circle and which thus results in an explosive or oscillatory path. As a coe cient of   = 0.99
appears in the equation (7) of the households, one would, in particular, expect unstable dynamics
for v¯.
3 New experimental design
The experiment took place in the BES laboratory at Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain)
in April and May 2015. The whole experiment was computerized, conducted in Spanish and
the program was written in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Most subjects were undergraduate stu-
dents studying Business Administration, Economics, Engineering, Humanities, Management or
Medicine. The experiment consisted of 50 periods. Every subject was only allowed to participate
in one experimental session.
I first investigated the replicability of the experiments by Assenza et al. (2014) and Pfajfar and
Zˇakelj (2014) in this laboratory and thus ran two groups with a reduced-form design based on
the “DIS equation” (27) and the “Phillips curve” (28). Appendix 9.2 shows that the result of
these replications conforms with the previous results of Assenza et al. (2014) and Pfajfar and
Zˇakelj (2014), i.e. that a Taylor rule coe cient  ⇡ just outside the unit circle guarantees quick
convergence to the REE.
The new experimental design based on a structural-form New-Keynesian model consists of7
• computerized households
• computerized firms
• a computerized central bank
• 6 HUMAN household advisors being asked to submit Eˆit v¯it+1
• 6 HUMAN firm advisors being asked to submit Eˆjt p⇤jt+1
7By assumption, fiscal policy has no e↵ect on the beliefs of computerized households and aggregate output is
entirely independent of the paths of both public debt and taxes. Hence, mentioning the existence of a government
to agents might only create confusion and does not provide any benefits.
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Hence, there were two possible roles to which subjects were randomly assigned: an “advisor to
firms” or an “advisor to households”. They keep the same role for the duration of the whole
experiment. As opposed to the design of Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al. (2014),8
who ask subjects to forecast aggregate outcomes, subjects in my experiment forecast individual
outcomes.
3.1 Role 1: Household advisor
In each period, advisors to households are asked to submit Eˆit v¯
i
t+1. An alternative would be asking
them to forecast inflation, their own optimal consumption and bond holdings, but forecasting
several variables at the same time complicates the task for subjects.9
3.2 Role 2: Firm advisor
In each period, advisors to firms are asked to submit Eˆjt p
⇤j
t+1, i.e. the forecast of the deviation of a
firm’s own optimal price in the next period (t+1) from the general price level in the current period
(t). Since in the model only the forecasts of the subsample of firms matters that is chosen by the
Calvo mechanism to reoptimize their prices, subjects were informed that the firm that seeks their
advice can be di↵erent in each period. This way the forecasts of all subjects could be considered
for the inflation dynamics. Due to identical production technologies of all firms, the optimal price
setting p⇤j1t of a particular firm j1 in period t can be compared to the forecast of this optimal
price setting made in the previous period for a possibly di↵erent firm j2, Eˆt 1p
⇤j2
t . Since deflation
beyond  100% is impossible,  100% was introduced as a natural lower bound. To be consistent
across groups,  100% was also set as a lower bound for the household advisors.10
3.3 Aggregate outcomes
Due to a continuum of agents in the model, the influence of one person should be infinitesimally
small. Since it is not possible to conduct the experiment with a very large number of subjects,
aggregate outcomes are proxied by medians so that in particular
8See Appendix 9.2 for more details.
9Since leaving variables in abstract terms would make the instructions too complicated, v¯t was labeled for
participants as the deviation of real expenditure (out of the current labor income) from a household’s “usual
expenditure”. See Section 2 for the explanation why v¯t is closely related to a household’s real expenditure. “Usual
expenditure” is supposed to be a more intuitive description of the long-run steady state and was explained to be
participants to be “average expenditure per period that a household can expect to be able to a↵ord over time.”
10For technical and operational reasons, I also had to introduce an upper bound, which was set to 1000.
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• p⇤t is the median price change of firms that are paired with subjects
• v¯t is the median of v¯it across households advised by subjects
• R 1i=0 Eˆit v¯it+1di is the median expectation of all household advisors
• R 1j=0 Eˆjt p⇤jt+1dj is the median expectation of all firm advisors
3.4 Information provided to subjects
3.4.1 Beginning of the experiment
All subjects received the same instructions,11 which informed them about their own role, the role
of the other group and I also gave qualitative information about the economy. The qualitative
information included explanations of the macroeconomic variables and a verbal description of
equations (7) and (26). Subjects did not know the coe cients in the equations or the steady states
of the model.12 Apart from the fact that this has become standard for complex experimental
games13 as this one, this approach can be justified in particular as follows: firstly, it is not
realistic that agents have fixed rules in mind when making decisions, but that these rules need
to be extracted from possibly long histories of past data. Secondly, two central questions of
the adaptive macroeconomic learning literature can be considered to be: firstly, whether REEs
are learnable solely from a su ciently long history of data; secondly, since the macroeconomic
literature commonly assumes that agents in the model know its structural equations, it addresses
the question how agents inside the model learn the structure of the economy. These questions also
lie at the core of this study.14
3.4.2 Information at the beginning of period t
In every period t, individuals can observe their own outcomes and payo↵s as well as the macroe-
conomic variables - output gap, inflation and interest rate - up to period t-1, as well as all their
11The full instructions are available upon request.
12Full price indexation in this context could also be interpreted as the firms not chosen by the Calvo mechanism
adjusting their prices on average by the long-run steady state.
13See e.g. Nagel and Vriend (1999), Lei and Noussair (2002), Hommes et al. (2005), Hommes et al. (2008),
Heemeijer et al. (2009), Bao et al. (2013), Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014)
14Arifovic and Petersen (2015) deviate from this approach and provide agents with the model equations, but
their focus is on comparing di↵erent policies in the laboratory and whether agents learn the REE is not a central
question in their study.
17
predictions including the one for period t made at time t-1. The information was both shown in
a history table and depicted graphically. (see Figure 1 for an exemplary screenshot)
Figure 1: Computer screen for a household advisor with graphed time series and corresponding
history table
3.5 Payo↵
Participants are rewarded according to how close their forecast is to the actual optimal outcome
in the next period. The payo↵ function is of the same functional form as in Adam (2007), Pfajfar
and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al. (2014):15
Score =
100
1 + |Forecast error| (35)
where the forecast error is Eˆit v¯
i
t+1   v¯it+1 for the advisors to households and Eˆjt p⇤jt+1   p⇤jt+1 for the
advisors to firms. Subjects were informed about the functional form of the payo↵ function and
were provided with a graph and a table in the instructions, illustrating the relationship between
the forecast error and the payo↵. Hence, the scores were based on how close participants’ forecasts
were to the actual outcome in the next period. The payo↵ units were fictitious and converted to
15This payo↵ function is to be preferred to a quadratic distance metric. Quadratic distance functions become
very flat for small forecast errors so that subjects have little incentives to think about small fluctuations in the
variables that they need to forecast.
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euros according to a fixed exchange rate which was 1 euro per 150 points. In addition, participants
received a show-up fee of 4 euros.16 Average earnings per session ranged between 15 and 25 euros.
4 Treatments
Treatment 1 is based on the structural model with (32) and  ⇡ being 0.5 so that the Taylor
principle is not fulfilled.17
Treatment 2 is based on the structural model with system (33) and  ⇡ being 1.5 so that the Taylor
principle is satisfied.  ⇡ = 1.5 is the original coe cient found by Taylor (1993) and, moreover,
the coe cient used by Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and Assenza et al. (2014).
Treatment 3 uses the structural model with system (34) and  ⇡ being 3. The motivation for this
treatment is twofold: Firstly, Clarida et al. (2000) find that US monetary policy in periods of
macroeconomic stability reacts more strongly to inflation with empirical estimates of  ⇡ ranging
from 2.15 to 3.13, depending on the subsample and the planning horizon of the central bank.18
The second reason is the lacking evidence for convergence with  ⇡ = 1.5. The treatments are
summarized in Table 2, also showing the number of observations (groups) collected for each
treatment:
Treatment  ⇡ no. observ. avg. earnings v (p) in points
1 0.5 2 373 (319)
2 1.5 4 2207 (1939)
3 3 4 2529 (2897)
Table 2: Treatments
5 Results
5.1 Aggregation over groups
Figure 2 shows the aggregates of inflation and output gap over the di↵erent experimental groups.
The following observations stand out:
16The fixed payo↵ in treatment 1 had to be adjusted to 14 euros to guarantee an adequate reward for two-and-
a-half-hours in the experiment.
17I refrain from using  ⇡ close to 1, since as  ⇡ ! 1 the (solved) equation for households becomes vit = 0.99Eˆitvit+1.
Hence, only the individual forecast would matter and not the forecasts of other participants.
18Target horizons play no role in this experimental study. One reason why central banks adopt a target horizon
is that monetary policy a↵ects macroeconomic variables with some lag. (Clarida et al. (2000), p.160) However, by
design, in the experimental economy, monetary policy contemporaneously a↵ects macroeconomic variables so that
there is no good reason to engage in forward-looking behavior for the central bank.
19












Reduced form vs. structural form

















Figure 2: Aggregation over experimental groups
Observation 1. Not fulfilling the Taylor principle (Treatment 1 with  ⇡ = 0.5) leads to diver-
gence.
Observation 2. With the Taylor principle barely satisfied (Treatment 2 with  ⇡ = 1.5), inflation
tends to remain above the RE steady state and there is no evidence that the economy converges
within 50 periods.
Observation 3. With particularly aggressive monetary policy (Treatment 3 with  ⇡ = 3), the
economy converges to the RE steady state within 50 periods and tends to be similarly stable to
the reduced-form experiment.
5.2 Results at the group level
Analyzing single experimental groups could be important, since large heterogeneity between them
is an indicator that the economic development under this particular monetary policy regime ex-
20
hibits high uncertainty.
Observation 4. For low Taylor rule coe cients, i.e.  ⇡ = 0.5 or  ⇡ = 1.5, there is considerable
inter-group heterogeneity, while the heterogeneity tends to vanish with more aggressive monetary
policy, i.e.  ⇡ = 3.






































Figure 3: Outcomes with  ⇡ = 0.5
Figure 3 shows that the dynamics di↵er between the two groups in treatment 1 with  ⇡ = 0.5:
in group 1, aggregate outcomes follow an explosive path and never return to the vicinity of the
REE. In group 2, the path of macroeconomic variables displays extreme fluctuations.
Also figure 4 shows considerable heterogeneity between the four groups in treatment 2 with
 ⇡ = 1.5: groups 1 and 2 tend to display relatively low fluctuations above the steady state, while
group 4 displays larger fluctuations. In group 3, it looks as if there is convergence to the REE in
period 42, although this conclusion should be treated with caution since there is a downward-trend
in output gap from period 47 and inflation also decreases from period 49 to period 50.
In contrast, figure 5 shows less distinct heterogeneity for the groups of treatment 4 with  ⇡ = 3,
as the outcomes are all fairly stable and close to the RE steady state. This is similar to the
reduced-form experimental design. (Appendix 9.2.3 for the two reduced-form groups) In some
groups, the output gap exhibits some instability and displays persistent fluctuations. Yet, these
fluctuations are considerably lower than in the sessions with  ⇡ = 1.5.
Observation 5. In treatment 3 with  ⇡ = 3, inflation fluctuations tend to be countercyclical
with respect to output fluctuations.
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Figure 4: Outcomes with  ⇡ = 1.5
This stylized fact can be explained by the higher Taylor rule, reducing the positive feedback
in the system.
5.3 Evaluation of the results
Table 3 shows the average quadratic distance from the REE of each group. The highest distance
from the RE steady state is achieved, when the Taylor principle is not satisfied. However, this
at best implies that the Taylor principle is necessary for learnability but not that it is su cient.
Treatment 2 with  ⇡ = 1.5, where the Taylor principle is satisfied, still does not provide evidence
for convergence to the RE steady state. Interestingly, the average quadratic distance in all ob-
servations is considerably above the ones found in the reduced form with the same Taylor rule
coe cient.
Only if the monetary authority adopts a Taylor principle with coe cient 3, the quadratic distance
22
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Figure 5: Outcomes with  ⇡ = 3
from the REE becomes su ciently small so that in this case the REE provides a good approxima-
tion to actual economic outcomes. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows a significant
di↵erence for the average quadratic di↵erence between inflation in treatments 2 and 3 (p-value:
0.0286), while for the output gap the di↵erence between treatments 2 and 3 exhibits borderline
significance (p-value: 0.0571).
6 Modeling expectation formation
The objective of this paper is not only describing the results of the experiment but investigating
whether the experimental data support an alternative formal modeling device that can be used
instead of rational expectations. A quantitative model of expectation formation should ideally be
able to forecast the evolution of macroeconomic time series under di↵erent coe cients, a di↵erent
number of players or for a di↵erent time length than the ones used in the experimental sessions.
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Treatment  ⇡ Group Inflation Output gap
1 0.5 1 76524.54 154036
1 0.5 2 37769.78 19311.5
2 1.5 1 0.81 0.68
2 1.5 2 1.21 2.35
2 1.5 3 2.11 4.42
2 1.5 4 6.21 4.98
3 3 1 0.35 1.22
3 3 2 0.16 0.21
3 3 3 0.19 0.30
3 3 4 0.05 0.15
RF = reduced form; SF = structural form
Table 3: Average quadratic distance from the RE steady state
There are two general approaches to modeling learning: The first approach is finding a parsimo-
nious model with few parameters that is relatively easy to track and that predicts behavior well on
average. This view tends to be taken in the macroeconomic learning literature. Adaptive learning,
a frequently taken approach in macroeconomic contexts, tends to rely on few parameters and on
the weak assumption that agents adjust their beliefs in the direction of the observed outcomes.
(Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Sargent, 1994; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) Adaptive learning could
be expected to correctly predict the aggregate patterns of non-convergence for 1.5 and convergence
for 3 within 50 periods, as faster convergence for a higher Taylor rule coe cient was shown by Or-
phanides and Williams (2007) and Ferrero (2007) in a reduced-form New-Keynesian framework.
The second approach is building up behavioral models of heterogeneous expectations, which are
not only supposed to fit aggregate outcomes but also individual outcomes. A way how individual
heterogeneity has previously been introduced into learning is that agents choose among a finite
set of forecasting models, each of which has an endogenous probability of being chosen. (Brock
and Hommes, 1997; Anufriev and Hommes, 2012a)
To assess the empirical performance of the learning models, I create agent-based computational
economic (ACE) path simulations, which is a common methodology to understand the aggregate
behavior in laboratory experiments with human subjects. (See Du↵y (2006) for a detailed survey)
A path simulation uses initial behavior (e.g. the first two observations) from the experimental
sessions with the human subjects and subsequently calculates the experimental outcomes for fic-
titious computerized subjects that are endowed with the learning rules given in the models. The
criterion for model assessment is how well, in terms of mean square error to the experimental data,
a simulated path over 50 periods created by the model can replicate the time series of the di↵erent
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experimental groups. Additionally, following the idea of Kydland and Prescott (1982), I consider
whether the model simulations are able to match a set of aggregate and individual statistics. For
the sake of conciseness, the average of the outcomes and other statistics over experimental groups
are reported.
6.1 Modeling average behavior: Noisy adaptive learning
Appendix 9.3 shows that adaptive learning both with least squares and with constant gain qual-
itatively predicts large di↵erences in the convergence patterns between  ⇡ = 0.5,  ⇡ = 1.5 and
 ⇡ = 3. Yet, it would merely predict fluctuations in the presence of exogenous noise. Since in
this experimental economy there is no exogenous noise and all shocks come from the subjects, an
intriguing question to explore is whether the fit of an adaptive learning model to the data can be
improved by specifying noise in subjects’ learning processes. This would allow for more random-
ness in individuals’ behavior and thus also address the conceptual concern of heuristic-switching
models that subjects’ behavior may not be accurately described by a discrete, finite set of rules.
This section develops a simple model that has three building blocks: an adaptive rule as a bench-
mark; shocks representing randomness and an endogenous variance. The model thus adopts and
combines concepts from di↵erent kinds of literatures: adaptive learning similarly to Marcet and
Sargent (1989), Sargent (1994) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), randomness in behavior as
in the microeconomic learning literature (see e.g. Anderson et al. (2004)) and conditional het-
eroskedasticity as in the financial econometrics literature (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). While
the exposition is for v¯i, the procedure is exactly analogous for p⇤j.
6.1.1 The adaptive specification



























t 1   Eˆit 2v¯it 1) (38)
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(36) is the specification as it is commonly used in the adaptive learning literature. (Marcet and
Sargent, 1989; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) However, this specification would be inconsistent
with the information structure in the experiment, as v¯it is unknown at the time where agents need
to submit Eˆit v¯t+1.
(37) would be the specification, using the standard assumption in the macroeconomic learning
literature that agents’ perceived law of motion corresponds to the minimum-state variable solution,
giving a perceived law of motion corresponding to a constant. (37) is the recursive form of agents’
estimate of this constant, using observations until period t-1.
(38) is plausible in an environment, where agents need to make two-period ahead forecasts such as




t+1 and thus cannot be known at the time of being
asked to submit Eit v¯
i
t+1. (38) states that agents adjust their forecasts in the direction of the last
observed forecast error, v¯it 1   Eit 2v¯it 1. Thus, it corresponds to an explicit specification of the
“directional learning hypothesis” (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Selten, 1998), which has frequently
been used in the microeconomic learning literature (see e.g. Nagel (1995); Anderson et al. (2004))
and which proposes that agents tend to shift their decisions in the direction of a best response to
recent outcomes.19
Another degree of freedom is the gain sequence, as one could adopt a decreasing gain scheme such
as  t = (t  1) 1, a constant gain learning scheme such as  t =  ¯, 8t or an endogenous gain as for
instance proposed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003).
When introducing exogenous noise with endogenous variance as described below, it turns out that
(38) with constant gain provides the best fit to the experimental data among these specifications.
Appendix 9.6 shows that a decreasing gain delivers much worse outcomes for Treatment 2 ( ⇡ =
1.5) than constant gain and endogenous gain only yields slight improvements for Treatment 3
( ⇡ = 3.0) but does not seem preferable, as it renders the model considerably more intractable.
19The non-recursive form of (38) would imply that agents merely consider the even or the odd outcomes respec-
tively. This can be reconciled by the behavioral assumption of imperfect recall. Similarly to Molavi et al. (2015), I
assume that agents treat vit 1  Eˆit 2vit 1, i.e. the discrepancy between the last available outcome and the forecast
of that particular observation, as a su cient statistic for all information available to them without considering how
Eˆit 2vit 1 was formed. Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present another application of imperfect recall.
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6.1.2 Introducing randomness
I first investigate how forecasting behavior of individuals in the experiment di↵ers from a forecaster












t 1   Eˆi,ADAt 2 v¯it 1) (39)
and the deviation of the actual forecast submitted by the subject from the adaptive forecast, (39),
as
⌘it ⌘ Eˆit v¯it+1 Eˆi,ADAt v¯it+1 (40)
Figure 6 shows the distributions for ⌘it over the range -20 to 20.
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Observation 6. As shown in figure 6, ⌘it is approximately normally distributed.
Observation 7. The variance of the distribution of ⌘it di↵ers considerably across treatments. The
lower  ⇡, the more likely extreme deviations from an adaptive rule occur.
Motivated by observations 6 and 7, I specify the shock ⌘it ⇠ N(0,  2t,i) as a random draw from
a normal distribution with an endogenous variance that depends on the forecast errors that would




(1  !)j 1(v¯it j   Eˆi,ADAt j 1 v¯it j)2 (41)
= (1  !) 2t 1,i + !(v¯it 1   Eˆi,ADAt 2 v¯it 1)2 (42)
(42) postulates that if an adaptive rule performs well (poorly), subjects follow an adaptive rule
more (less) closely, as deviations from an adaptive rule tend to be small (large).
20The gain  ¯ is calibrated as 0.2, being the maximum likelihood estimate obtained in Section 6.1.3.
21This range comprises over 90 % of all observations in treatments 2 and 3, but less than 50 % of all observations
for treatment 1.









t 1   Eˆit 2vit 1) + ⌘it
with endogenous shock variance
 2t,i = (1  !) 2t 1,i + !(vit 1   Eˆit 2vit 1)2
This approach is considerably less successful in fitting the experimental data no matter whether one uses (36),(37)
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Figure 6: Deviations from adaptive rule with a constant gain of 0.2
Hence, this approach can be considered a more tractable simplification of the heuristic-switching
model by Brock and Hommes (1997) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012a). The di↵erence from
Anufriev and Hommes (2012a), who model deviations from an adaptive rule as switching to dif-
ferent forecasting rules, is that I consider random deviations from the adaptive rule. Furthermore,
noisy adaptive learning not only reproduces the convergence result of the reduced-form setup (see
Appendix 9.2.4) but also, in contrast to the heuristic-switching model, predicts the di↵erent dy-
namic patterns in treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5) and treatment 3 ( ⇡ = 3.)
Noisy adaptive learning is also related to endogenous variance models in the financial economet-
rics literature (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). In fact, (42) could be considered a GARCH(1,1)
specification, as it includes the first lag of the variance itself and the last observed (i.e. the first
lag of the) forecast error, which is the explanatory variable in the specification of the conditional
mean of a subject i’s forecast.
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6.1.3 Estimation














2, i.e. the first
two expectations submitted by each subject in the experiment. In period 2, Eˆi,ADA2 v¯
i
3 is calculated
according to (39) and the variance is initialized according to (42) as  2,i2 = !(v¯
i
1 Eˆi0v¯i1)2. Following
a standard approach in the experimental (see e.g. Stahl (1996), Roth and Erev (1998), Camerer
and Ho (1999)) and macroeconomic literature (see e.g. McGrattan et al. (1997)), the parameters  ,
and ! are estimated by maximum likelihood using the individual data all treatments, which gives
parameter estimates of   = 0.20 and ! = 0.62.23 Figure 7, depicting the experimental data and
the mean of 6,000 replications of the simulation, shows that the noisy learning model captures the
di↵erences in the speed of convergence between treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5) and treatment 3 ( ⇡ = 3)
and the explosive patterns in treatment 1 ( ⇡ = 0.5.) Appendix 9.2.4 shows that noisy learning
can also replicate the convergence in the reduced-form design with  ⇡ = 1.5. Single replications
with the noisy learning model are shown in Appendix 9.5.2.
6.2 Modeling average and individual behavior: reinforcement
Appendix 9.4.1 shows that a major drawback of the heuristic-switching model by Brock and
Hommes (1997) is that it predicts too fast convergence for  ⇡ = 1.5. Hence, it is worthwhile to
reconsider the single components of this model: The steps are 1. evaluating which information
individuals use in this more complex setup than the reduced form (Section 6.2.1); 2. investigating
which forecasting rules individuals use (Section 6.2.2); 3. describing the model of endogenous
switching (Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4) in which these rules are used.
6.2.1 Which information do individuals use?
The approach taken to analyze which information individuals use is running OLS-regressions on
all information available to subjects. One challenge to these regressions is that in the structural
form, by construction, the individual outcomes are perfectly linear functions of both the individ-
ual forecasts and the aggregate outcomes, which results in strong multicollinearity when using
regressions. This is not only apparent for regressions at individual level (sample size: 50) but
even for regressions on individual data at group level (sample size: 600=12 subjects·50 periods),
23Estimating the model under the hypothesis of random shocks gives di↵erent gain parameters from the baseline
case without random shocks. One explanation is given by Engle (1982), showing that maximum likelihood, jointly
estimating the parameters of the mean and variance specifications, gives more e cient parameter estimates.
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Figure 7: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 6,000
replications) aggregated outcomes using noisy learning
forecaster type level (sample size: 1200=4 groups · 6 subjects·50 periods) and even treatment
level (sample size: 2400=4 groups · 12 subjects·50 periods), where estimation requires omitting
regressors due to collinearity. Providing enough variation in the data to disentangle the e↵ect
of di↵erent variables required pooled panel vector autoregressions (VARs) for both forecasting


























⇠pit p + ⌘t,i (43)
so that subjects’ forecasts of their individual variables xit = {v¯it, p⇤jt } are regressed on the first
three lags of all potential available information: the individual outcome, the sample mean of the
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individual outcomes xi,avt l until time t  l, the individual forecast, inflation, aggregate expenditure
and the interest rate.24 Standard errors were clustered at subject level. Besides the baseline
pooled OLS-regression over all treatments, I provide the following robustness checks: a) inclusion
of individual fixed e↵ects25 and b) omitting the unstable treatment 1 ( ⇡ = 0.5). Table 4 reports
the results.
In all specifications, the means of the past outcomes are highly significant. Due to the high
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tr. 1-3 Tr. 1-3 Tr. 2-3 Tr. 2-3
Dep. variable: Forecast
Outcome (lag 1) -0.0712 0.0441 0.708 0.691*
Outcome (lag 2), -0.224 -0.211 -0.964 -0.855
Outcome (lag 3), 0.0805 0.158 0.367 0.537
Mean past outcome (lag 1), 9.722*** 8.275*** 10.13*** 8.530***
Mean past outcome (lag 2), -12.19** -10.11** -12.17*** -10.32***
Mean past outcome (lag 3), 2.893 2.143 2.278** 1.787*
Forecast (lag 1) 0.440*** 0.353** -0.284 -0.239
Forecast (lag 2) 0.334 0.288 1.073 0.954
Forecast (lag 3) -0.0740 -0.156* -0.350 -0.506
Inflation (lag 1) 0.454 -0.345 4.816 4.172
Inflation (lag 2) -0.0222 0.314 -7.309 -6.805
Inflation (lag 3) 0.720* -0.0509 3.779 2.603
Aggregate v (lag 1) -0.0235 -0.0156 -0.698 -0.668
Aggregate v (lag 2) 0.213 0.213 1.833 1.800
Aggregate v (lag 3) -0.0919 -0.0794 -0.795 -0.808
Interest rate (lag 1) -0.268 1.165 -1.109 -0.697
Interest rate (lag 2) -0.884 -1.573** 0.110 -0.106
Interest rate (lag 3) -1.279** 0.186 -0.0952 0.517
Constant 16.99*** 11.77** 5.563** 4.847
Fixed e↵ects NO YES NO YES
Observations 5,640 5,640 4,512 4,512
R2 0.789 0.600 0.786 0.714
Number of subjects 120 120 96 96
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Regression
collinearity, F-tests for joint significance have been conducted on the null hypothesis that the
24Panel regressions often include time fixed e↵ects to capture omitted factors that are common in the period.
Since in this application all information that subjects receive is controlled for, the interpretation of these time
dummies would become dubious.
25Nickell (1981) shows that the fixed e↵ects estimator is inconsistent when the strict exogeneity assumption is
violated like in this application with a dynamic panel. However, as the number of time periods is large, the bias is
small.
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aggregate variables have no predictive power for individual forecasting behavior. In regressions
1 and 2, only higher-order lags of the interest rate are significant, which seems a non-credible
result. If one excludes the significant higher-order lags of the interest rate, the hypothesis that the
remaining variables have a zero e↵ect could not be rejected at the 5 % significance level neither in
regression 1 (p-value: 0.0876) nor in regression 2 (p-value: 0.1126). Once the unstable treatment
1 ( ⇡ = 0.5) is removed, the aggregate variables are all jointly highly insignificant (p-value in
regression 3: 0.3594; p-value in regression 4: 0.3721) Lags one to three of the individual forecasts
and outcomes, however, are jointly highly significant independently of the specification.
Eyeballing the data gives rise to a strong concern that behavior cannot be adequately captured by
linear forecasting models. A Ramsey RESET test, which detects potential misspecification and
structural breaks, provides strong evidence that this general linear model is misspecified for each
specification (p-value: 0.0000), a result which remains robust when the insignificant variables are
removed. (p-value: 0.0000)
6.2.2 Individual regressions
I focus on forecasting rules based on individual variables for three reasons: first, there is no
evidence in the pooled regression that aggregate variables play any role in determining forecasting
behavior; secondly, the inclusion of aggregate and individual variables would cause collinearity in
regressions at individual level; thirdly, the assumption that subjects use heuristics solely based on
the variable they are asked to forecast is frequently made in learning-to-forecast experiment. (See
e.g. Assenza et al. (2014), Anufriev and Hommes (2012a)).
The rules considered are the ones that have been found to be important in previous learning-to-
forecast experiments and are described in more detail in table 5:
Rule Description
adaptive ADA xet+1 = x
e
t + ↵(xt 1   xet )
trend-following TR xet+1 = xt 1 + ↵(xt 1   xt 2)
anchor & adjustment LAA xet+1 = 0.5(x
av
t 1 + xt 1) + ↵(xt 1   xt 2)
xt = {v¯it, p⇤jt }
Table 5: Set of heuristics
I determine which linear model describes each subject best on average by running an OLS
regression for each rule and for each individual. Since in all three rules, one coe cient had to
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be estimated, R2 could be used to determine the best linear model for each subject.26 Figure 8
shows considerable heterogeneity in forecasting behavior both across treatments and across roles
(household vs. firm advisor.)
Observation 8. In all treatments, households engage more in adaptive behavior than firms.






















Figure 8: Characterization of the subjects
6.2.3 Endogenous switching
The analysis in Section 6.2.2, assuming that individuals can throughout be represented by the
same forecasting model, represents a simplistic view, as previous learning-to-forecast experiments
(Anufriev and Hommes, 2012a; Bao et al., 2013; Pfajfar and Zˇakelj, 2014; Assenza et al., 2014)
document that switching between di↵erent models provides a more accurate description of their
26The use of R2 is equivalent to the use other measures, such as sum of squared errors (SSE) or mean square
error (MSE).
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decisions. Therefore, Brock and Hommes (1997) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) endogenize
the switching probability by linking it to the past performance of di↵erent forecasting rules.
Their model presumes a finite set of forecasting rules H. Given the evidence in 6.2.2, I use the same
four heuristics (adaptive, weak trend-following, strong trend-following, anchor and adjustment) as
Anufriev and Hommes (2012a).27 However, one heuristic is added, as it is frequently observed in
Treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5): unchanged behavior, which means submitting exactly the same forecast
as in the previous period so that xet+1 = x
e
t . This is a special case of adaptive (ADA) forecasting
with ↵ = 0. The precise specifications of the five heuristics are given in table 6. While the
Rule Description
adaptive ADA xe1,t+1 = 0.3xt 1 + 0.7x
e
1,t
weak trend-following WTR xe2,t+1 = xt 1 + 0.4(xt 1   xt 2)
strong trend-following STR xe3,t+1 = xt 1 + 1.3(xt 1   xt 2)
anchor & adjustment LAA xe4,t+1 = 0.5(x
av
t 1 + xt 1) + (xt 1   xt 2)
unchanged UC xe5,t+1 = x
e
5,t
xt = {v¯it, p⇤jt }
Table 6: Set of heuristics
heuristic-switching model correctly predicts the explosive behavior for  ⇡ = 0.5, the model does not
accurately predict the distinction between  ⇡ = 1.5 and  ⇡ = 3 as it is observed in the experimental
treatments, because the heuristic-switching model predicts relatively fast convergence for  ⇡ = 1.5
to the RE steady state, while in the experiment, in particular for p⇤, there is no evidence for
convergence to the RE steady state within 50 periods.
Observation 10. The di↵erent game structure in the structural form as compared to the reduced
form makes it less plausible that subjects consider “fictitious play.”
The heuristic-switching model assumes that subjects fix the outcomes in their minds and con-
sider the fictitious ceteris-paribus payo↵s that unchosen strategies would have yielded. However,
in the structural form, subjects are informed that their outcome depends not only on aggregate
behavior but also on their individual forecasts. From a conceptual point of view, it is therefore not
reasonable to hold the outcome fixed and consider the payo↵ of an alternative strategy. Thus, the
rule to which subjects switch may be determined by experimentation rather than by fictitious play
considerations, an idea which is referred to as “reinforcement learning” (Roth and Erev, 1998).
27I follow Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) in obtaining the coe cients of the heuristics from subject-level regres-
sions. While the coe cients for trend-following rules are similar to reduced-form experiments, the gain coe cient
in the adaptive rule di↵ered considerably between the structural and the reduced form. While the median gain
across all subjects of type ADA in the reduced form replication corresponded roughly to 0.65, which is the estimates
of Anufriev and Hommes (2012a), in the structural the median gain was approximately 0.3.
34
If this argument is correct, one would observe that a reinforcement model performs considerably
better than the heuristic-switching model.
6.2.4 Specification for reinforcement
There are two related modeling approaches for reinforcement: firstly, introducing a parameter
that governs fictitious play into Anufriev and Hommes (2012a); secondly, returning to the original
specification by Roth and Erev (1998).
Table 6.2.4 illustrates the similarities and di↵erences between Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) and
Roth and Erev (1998). Both models consist of an equation updating the performance of each
heuristic h for an individual i. The crucial di↵erence is that Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) con-
sider fictitious play so that they do not distinguish whether the heuristic h has been played or not,
while Roth and Erev (1998) merely update the performance of heuristics that have been played.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first application of Roth and Erev (1998) to data from a
“learning to forecast” experiment.
The performance measure of heuristic h (denoted U or q respectively, keeping the original nota-
tion of the papers) is then used to calculate the probability of playing this particular heuristic h,
where the probability of heuristics not being applied is not updated in Roth and Erev (1998). An
adaptation of Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) to my setup is the individual-superscript. This is
unnecessary for the original setups for which the model has been developed, where agents forecast
the same aggregate outcomes and nh,t thus depends on identical outcomes being common knowl-
edge. In my setting, subjects forecast individual outcomes, whose realizations are observed in
addition to aggregate data.28 I use the same calibration for the learning parameters as Anufriev
and Hommes (2012a) and Roth and Erev (1998).29
An idea would be introducing a parameter  , governing fictitious play, into Anufriev and Hommes
(2012a). Yet, it turns out that the approach by Roth and Erev (1998) yields a better quantitative
28Thus, there are two possible approaches: the first one is interpreting nih,t as the probabilities of agents using




h,t+1 with probability n
i
h,t. The second approach is interpreting n
i
h,t as the








h,t+1.While the latter approach results
in deterministic forecasts and outcomes, the former gives stochastic simulations so that each time the simulation is
executed the simulated path is di↵erent. There is little di↵erence in mean square error over repeated simulations
between these approaches.
29These parameters cannot be reestimated by maximum likelihood, as heuristic-switch and reinforcement merely
choose between five points for each subject, which would give a likelihood of zero if actual forecasts in the exper-
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Reinforcement
(Roth and Erev, 1998)
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(1   )qih,t 1 + Payo↵it 1 if rule h used
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Calibration:   = 0.9
  = 0.4
idea: reconsider relative weight of fictitious play  :
U ih,t 1 = ⌘U
i
h,t 1 + ( + (1   ) (h played))Payo↵it 1
Anufriev and Hommes (2012a):   = 1
  = 0
I follow Roth and Erev
(.) denotes the indicator function, being 1 if the statement in brackets is true and 0 otherwise
Table 7: Reinforcement
fit than Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) even when the  -parameter is introduced. (Details for the
simulation of the heuristic-switching model in Appendix 9.4.1). Appendix 9.2.4 shows that even
for the reduced-form model reinforcement yields a lower mean square error than the heuristic-
switching model for both aggregate variables.
The simulation is initialized by the first two individual outcomes for 6 individuals, two initial
attractions for each strategy, which have been set to 0.2 to give each strategy equal weight. With
the initial values and the initial probabilities, the outcomes in periods 3 and 4 can be computed.
From period 5, each individual expectation and outcomes is fully determined by the simulations.
For the starting values of each experimental group, 6,000 replications of the simulation have been
conducted. Finally, I average over all experimental groups. Examples of single replications are
given in Appendix 9.5.1. Figure 9 depicts the average outcomes over 6,000 replications, showing
that the reinforcement model only converges slowly in treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5).
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Figure 9: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 6,000
replications) aggregated outcomes using reinforcement
7 Model comparison
7.1 Criteria for model assessment
7.1.1 Mean square error (MSE)
One common criterion to evaluate the models is a quadratic loss function between the aggregate
outcomes v¯ and p⇤ in each experimental group and the aggregate outcomes v¯M and p⇤M created by
the simulated paths described above. This procedure is standard both in experimental economics
(see e.g. Roth and Erev (1998)) and in the macroeconomic learning literature (see e.g. Orphanides
and Williams (2007)), as a central focus in the both literatures are long-run phenomena such as
convergence. While the exposition is for v¯, the procedure is exactly analogous for p⇤. The mean
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(v¯t,g   vMt,g)2 (44)
where t is time period subscript and g is group subscript. Thus, v¯t,g is the aggregate expendi-
ture variable in group g in time period t, while v¯Mt,g is the forecast of the aggregate variable for
period t by model M. The particular v¯Mt,g that minimizes the mean square error is the conditional
expectation E(v¯Mt,g|[v¯1, ..., v¯6]t=1,2, [p⇤1, ..., p⇤6]t=1,2) (see e.g. Hamilton (1994); p. 72) Since noisy
learning and reinforcement are stochastic models and the conditional expectation of reinforcement
is particularly challenging to evaluate analytically, I use the ensemble average of a large number
of replications (N = 6, 000), which is a good approximation of the conditional expectation due
















where the n-subscript denotes the n-th replication. Due to the self-referential nature of the system,
the models exhibit path dependence so that the initial conditions can have a large impact on the
dynamic behavior of the outcomes. To address this concern, I discard the first 30 periods, as this
is standard for simulations in the learning literature to attenuate the e↵ect of initial conditions.
See for example Orphanides and Williams (2007).
7.1.2 First and second moments
Anufriev and Hommes (2012b) note that mean square error may be a dubious criterion to evaluate
models that exhibit fluctuations, as those are penalized if the fluctuations are out of phase with
the real data. To address this concern, I compare the first (mean) and second moments (standard
deviation) predicted by the path simulations of the learning models to those in the experiment.
7.1.3 Mean square distance (MSD) to REE
The mean is indicative of how fast the model converges, while the standard deviation is a measure
of the fluctuations. As a robustness check, it is useful to report a statistic that measures these
two concepts simultaneously, which is the mean square distance to the REE.
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7.1.4 Individual statistics
As a particularly interesting question to ask is how well the learning models capture the underlying
individual behavior, a set of individual statistics is reported: mean square error (MSE) and the
mean square distance (MSD) from REE averaged over all individuals as well as an index of










t ) for firm advisors.
7.2 Results
The results for noisy adaptive learning and reinforcement are reported in table 8 for all periods
and in table 9 for periods 30-50. The complete statistics for all learning models, including least
square learning, constant gain and heuristic-switching, are in Appendix 9.7. The simulation result
that is closer to the experimental data is bold-faced.30 The following results stand out:
Observation 11. Treatment 1 ( ⇡ = 0.5): While noisy adaptive learning qualitatively predicts
divergence, reinforcement provides a better quantitative fit.
Observation 12. Treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5): Noisy adaptive learning provides a better quantitative
fit than reinforcement.
Observation 13. Treatment 3 ( ⇡ = 3): While statistics for the whole sample indicate that
reinforcement is the better model, this conclusion may be driven by initial conditions. For periods
30-50 in treatment 3 ( ⇡ = 3), it largely depends on the statistic of interest which model receives
a better fit.
Hence, the answer to the question which model should be used for expectation formation
depends on the context: If the researcher looks for a tractable model with few parameters, noisy
adaptive learning may be a good choice. If the research focus is, on the other hand, for instance
on examining di↵erences in expectation formation for a divergent path as opposed to paths that
stay in the vicinity of the REE, a more sophisticated model such as reinforcement may need to
be used.
30Investigating significance is not conclusive in this context, as the sample size is very large due to a large number
of replications. An extremely large sample size leads to a standard error close to zero, which leads to extremely
low p-values even if the di↵erence is minimal.
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 ⇡ = 0.5  ⇡ = 1.5  ⇡ = 3.0
Measures Data Reinf. Noisy Data Reinf. Noisy Data Reinf. Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 149720.10 271734.30 0.00 7.68 7.25 0.00 0.71 1.24
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 305299.15 517709.31 0.00 18.29 18.21 0.00 1.02 1.92
Mean: v¯ 377.43 485.33 8.59 1.32 0.16 1.18 0.26 -0.02 -0.17
Mean: p⇤ 562.20 725.75 15.41 5.05 3.34 6.40 2.72 2.19 3.32
MSD from REE: v¯ 268390.11 443216.51 129.21 8.58 1634.55 5.34 0.75 1.22 1.86
MSD from REE: p⇤ 514324.42 925942.38 290.86 23.26 4376.35 24.57 1.70 2.47 4.08
Standard dev.: v¯ 311.47 402.38 6.03 2.41 1.68 1.74 0.71 0.69 1.27
Standard dev.: p⇤ 434.66 569.56 8.60 3.19 2.67 1.79 0.99 1.03 1.50
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 142536.97 347077.80 0.00 5068.70 7370.78 0.00 5895.72 8408.16
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 310652.46 508485.47 0.00 25.13 29.04 0.00 5.85 11.40
MSD from REE: v¯i 343486.43 674365.20 243.48 7152.72 82.78 109.26 8060.09 19.90 28.80
MSD from REE: p⇤j 505904.75 1320941.26 239.52 34.08 11.19 28.12 11.05 2.75 13.18
Dispersion of v¯i 278.19 219.71 14.54 45.67 25.24 8.91 31.93 18.92 7.54
Dispersion of p⇤j 160.10 42.83 5.81 2.92 1.65 3.21 1.86 1.26 2.91
MSE=mean square error; MSD=mean square distance
Table 8: Measures all periods
 ⇡ = 0.5  ⇡ = 1.5  ⇡ = 3.0
Measures Data Reinf. Noisy Data Reinf. Noisy Data Reinf. Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 201402.64 330359.47 0.00 8.26 7.28 0.00 0.32 0.84
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 383002.42 558448.10 0.00 20.25 14.71 0.00 0.59 0.43
Mean: v¯ 494.84 847.00 13.59 1.03 -0.39 0.21 0.10 -0.05 -0.54
Mean: p⇤ 707.07 1247.83 23.33 4.89 2.01 5.16 2.37 1.97 2.20
MSD from REE: v¯ 343633.59 847755.38 255.30 7.43 3887.46 2.50 0.31 2.04 1.08
MSD from REE: p⇤ 588244.14 1735919.83 583.50 21.57 10401.91 15.23 0.55 4.65 0.69
Standard dev.: v¯ 241.03 196.44 5.40 2.08 0.99 1.14 0.50 0.35 0.70
Standard dev.: p⇤ 272.92 188.03 6.79 2.69 1.42 1.11 0.49 0.38 0.60
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 176738.81 426851.90 0.00 2926.50 2693.71 0.00 2239.73 2415.66
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 400773.41 586213.54 0.00 25.59 19.16 0.00 2.51 3.99
MSD from REE: v¯i 444173.06 823199.31 689.85 2734.91 9610.66 102.91 2408.98 20902.58 85.68
MSD from REE: p⇤j 616582.76 1713221.67 634.34 27.13 10307.62 23.00 2.55 5.88 4.35
Dispersion of v¯i 360.54 299.81 15.87 35.15 27.24 8.84 17.97 25.59 7.18
Dispersion of p⇤j 221.88 46.21 6.02 2.29 1.08 1.99 1.00 0.52 1.64
MSE=mean square error; MSD=mean square distance
Table 9: Measures periods 30-50
8 Conclusion
This study has shown that due to the di↵erent feedback structure, the structural-form New-
Keynesian model does not produce the same results as the reduced-form New-Keynesian model.
This implies that analysts or researchers should be careful, if they draw policy implications based
on empirical analysis with the reduced-form New-Keynesian model. More generally, relying upon
RE models for policy analysis might not be constructive, if the observed process of expectation
formation exhibits bounded rationality, as conclusions and policy implications that are based
upon RE might be misleading. This study provides an important example, since the experimental
results indicate that barely fulfilling the Taylor principle can at best “prevent the worst” but
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exhibits no evidence of convergence to the REE even within the considerable time frame of 50
periods. A novel feature of this paper is the application of the reinforcement model by Roth and
Erev (1998) to data generated by a “learning-to-forecast” experiment. Furthermore, a theoretical
contribution is the noisy adaptive learning model based on the experimental data to explain both
the slow convergence for a Taylor rule coe cient of 1.5 in the structural form and the expectation-
driven fluctuations. Consistently with the experimental results, both adaptive learning and noisy
learning suggest that the monetary authority might need to adopt a reinforced Taylor principle
with a larger reaction coe cient to ensure E-stability of the REE.
Laboratory experiments are one example of providing empirical foundations for actual behavior,
but they are not the end of exploring bounded rationality. One needs to test their external validity
and find a good connection to decisions of real firms and households. This is crucial in order to
verify the policy recommendations implied by the experimental data and thus certainly a potential
direction of further research. Yet, laboratory experiments are a good starting point for several rea-
sons. firstly, they provide the closest link to the theoretical models, as important assumptions from
theory can easily be implemented in the laboratory. Secondly, they can o↵er intuition and hints,
pinpointing in which direction existing models could be extended and what to look for in real data.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Model in Woodford (2013)
9.1.1 The demand side
This cashless economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by i, seeking to maxi-




 T t[U(C iT ) ⌥(hiT (j))] (46)
where C it is a composite consumption good and Eˆ
i
t is an arbitrary subjective (not necessarily
rational) expectations operator of household i given the information set in period t, which however





i(j) is the amount of
labor supplied by household i for the production of good j. The second term in the brackets is
to be interpreted as the total disutility of labor supply. There is an equal number of households
supplying labor for each type of good.31
The household has no choice but supplying the hours of work demanded by the firm at the given
wage, being negotiated by a union on behalf of all households, so that H i(t) =
R 1
0 h
i(j) = Ht, 8i.
Thus, a household has a single decision each period, which is the amount to individually spend
on the composite consumption good, C it , defined as:














where cit(j) is the (real) expenditure of household i on good j. One main di↵erence of this het-
erogeneous agent model to the representative agent model is that households can have non-zero
asset holdings. There is one single riskless one-period bond in the economy and the household’s
law of motion of bond holdings can be written as










tdj   Tt] (48)
31Woodford (2003, p. 144↵.) shows that under this assumption, this is equivalent to a representative agent
supplying labor for each type of good.
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where it denotes the nominal interest rate on bonds held at the end of period t, Bit the household’s
nominal bond holdings carried into period t, Wt is the nominal wage, ⇧˜t(j) is nominal profits of
firm j (distributed in equal dividend shares to the households), pt(j) is the price of good j and Tt
denotes net lump-sum taxes. Since each firm’s profits are given by

























pt(j)yt(j)dj = PtYt (53)
where Yt is aggregate demand for the composite consumption good defined in (47). Standard anal-
















relations of the model are subsequently log-linearized around a deterministic steady state in which
(a) the inflation steady state ⇡¯ is set by the monetary authority, it ⇡ ln(1 + i¯) = ⇡¯   ln   (as
implied by (54))32, biT =
BiT
PT 1
= b¯, YT = Y¯ , CT = C¯ and ⌧¯T ⌘ TTPT = ⌧¯ for all T   t, (b) all
32Assenza et al. (2014) and Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) neglect the term ln .
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t+1    (ˆit   Eˆit ⇡ˆt+1) (55)
bˆit+1 =sb(ˆiT     1⇡ˆt)  1(bˆit + (Yˆt   ⌧ˆt)  cˆit) (56)
where sb ⌘ b¯Yˆ . “xˆt” (in minuscules) denotes the deviation from the steady state in natural loga-





in terms of steady state output, and the interest rate, where iˆt = ln
1+it
1+i¯ is used.
Solving (55) forward at time t and substituting the result into the also forward-solved equation
resulting from (56) gives:
cˆit = (1   )bˆit +
1X
T=t
 T tEˆit{(1   )(YˆT   ⌧ˆT )    (ˆiT   ⇡ˆT+1) + (1   )sb(  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )} (57)
(57) can be rewritten in its recursive form under internally consistent expectations of the household
as





 T tEˆit{(1   )(YˆT   ⌧ˆT )  [    (1   )sb](  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )} (59)
The advantage of this notation is that individuals only need to forecast a single variable. Using
the goods market clearing condition Yˆt =
R
cˆitdi, aggregate demand can be obtained as
Yˆt = (1   )bˆt + vt    ⇡ˆt (60)
Woodford (2013) assumes for simplicity that government expenditure is an exogenous disturbance,
but, since I introduce the model into the laboratory without any shocks, in my setup, the govern-
ment merely uses the taxes to service the debt it has accumulated. Hence, the government’s flow
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budget constraint is given as
bˆt+1 =  
 1[bˆt   sb⇡ˆt   ⌧ˆt] + sbiˆt (61)
(4) implies the recursive form
vit = (1   )vt +  (1   )(bˆt+1   bˆt)    (ˆit   ⇡ˆt) +  Eˆitvit+1 (62)
where vt =
R
vitdi is the average value across agents of the expectational variable defined in (4).






 T t[⌧ˆT   sb(  iˆT   ⇡ˆT )] (63)
This is a strong assumption. However, it simplifies the model considerably and this assumption
is frequently made in non-RE analyses. (See Woodford (2013) for a detailed discussion.) In the
context of this experiment, this can be interpreted as the computerized household understanding
that government cannot forever accumulate debt. Under this assumption, aggregate demand is
independent of the supply of public debt and can be more compactly written as
Yˆt = v¯t    ⇡ˆt (64)
where v¯t = vt + (1    )bˆt is the aggregate of a subjective variable v¯it, which is the variable that
one group of subjects, labeled as “household advisors”, needs to forecast in the experiment, and




Eˆit{(1   )YˆT    ( iT   ⇡T )} (65)
9.1.2 The supply side
We assume Calvo (1983) price-setting such that a fraction 0 < ↵ < 1 of goods prices are ex-
ogenously held fixed in any period. Producers engage in monopolistic competition, which means
that each firm sets the price for a good that it alone produces. Under full price indexation, the
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log-linearized approximation of the inflation dynamics is given by
⇡ˆt = (1  ↵)pˆ⇤t (66)
where, for each firm j that is chosen to re-optimize its price in period t, p⇤jt is the amount by which
the firm would choose to set the log price of its good higher than pt 1. p⇤t =
R
p⇤jt dj is the average
value of this variable across all firms that are chosen by the Calvo mechanism to reoptimize prices





↵T tEˆjt {Qt,T (P ⇤jt YT (j)⇧¯T t   (YT (j)))} (67)
subject to (51), where YT (j) denotes output in period T for a firm j,  (.) is the nominal cost
function and Qt,T is the stochastic discount factor, describing how a unit of income in each state







Denoting MCT |t =  tPT as the real marginal cost, the log-linearized first-order condition then takes
the form:
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵ )
1X
T=t
(↵ )T tEˆjt {poptT   pt 1   (T   t+ 1)⇡¯} (69)
where poptT ⌘ mˆct+ pT is the single-period optimal log price, being the same for each firm, as they
face the same labor market and aggregate conditions. Using the law of iterated expectations, one
can rewrite (19) in its recursive form:
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵ )(poptt   pt 1   ⇡¯) + ↵ (Eˆjt pˆ⇤jt+1 + ⇡ˆt) (70)
Suppose that a union sets the wage on behalf of the households under the objective that at that
wage, a marginal increase in labor demand would neither increase nor decrease average perceived
utility across households, if for each household the marginal utility of additional wage income is









By log-linearising (71), one obtains
!ˆt = #ˆt   uˆc,t (72)
where !t is the log real wage, #t is the log of the (common) marginal disutility of labor and uc,t
is the (log) aggregate of the marginal utility of additional real income. Since
uˆci,t =    1cˆit (73)
we have
!ˆt = #ˆt +  
 1cˆt = #ˆt +   1Yˆt (74)
Given that mˆct = !ˆt   mˆpnt and since both #ˆt and mˆpnt can be expressed as functions of labor
hours and thus as output (which is determined by the market clearing condition for the aggregate
goods market), one can summarize poptt as
poptt = pt + ⇠Yˆt (75)







it is easy to see that
⇠ ⌘   1 + ' (77)
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We obtain, by using (75) in (20):
pˆ⇤jt = (1  ↵)pˆ⇤t + (1  ↵ )⇠Yˆt + ↵ Eˆjt pˆ⇤jt+1 (78)
9.2 Reduced form
9.2.1 Systems
In matrix form, the system comprising the “dynamic IS” equation (27) and the “Phillips curve”
(28) can be rewritten as
264v¯t
⇡t




with  ⌘ 1(↵+ ⇡ ⇠ ↵ ⇡ ⇠ ↵  ⇡ ⇠+↵2  ⇡ ⇠) and
d ⌘
264 ↵  ( ⇡   1)
↵(1   ) +  ⇡ ⇠(1  ↵)(1  ↵ )
375 ;C ⌘
264↵ +  ⇠(1  ↵)(1  ↵ )  ↵  ( ⇡   1)
⇠(↵  1)(↵    1) ↵ 
375 (80)
With the calibration given in Table 1, being the same parameter as in Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014)






I follow the existing design based on the reduced-form (Pfajfar and Zˇakelj, 2014; Assenza et al.,
2014), which consists of
• a computerized central bank
• 6 HUMAN output gap forecasters being asked to submit EˆtY˜t+1
• 6 HUMAN inflation forecasters being asked to submit Eˆt⇡t+1
Since the objective of this experiment is to replicate previous findings, I follow Assenza et al.
(2014) and Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) and elicit the simple averages of the forecasts of di↵erent
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individuals. Since I expected convergence in the reduced form, I used a di↵erent exchange rate (1
euro per 250 points) in order to save resources.
9.2.3 Results with  ⇡ = 1.5
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Figure 10: Reduced-form outcomes
Observation 14. In the reduced form with  ⇡ = 1.5, the economy converges to the REE after
30 periods.
Figure 10 depicts the macroeconomic outcomes for the reduced form. Both groups converge
to the REE, although out-of-equilibrium behavior at the beginning di↵ers across groups: While
group 1 converges to the REE after about 15 periods, group 2 takes about 20 periods. Due to
Preston’s [2005] criticism on the internal validity of this approach and since the paramount result
that in both groups the experimental economy converges to the REE is consistent with Assenza
et al. (2014) and with Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014), no further sessions with the reduced form were
conducted and the paper only entails a minimalistic analysis of this experiment.
9.2.4 Learning models and reduced form
The same learning models that have been applied to the structural form were also applied to the
reduced form. The following points are worth highlighting:
• Since the heuristic-switching model was originally developed for setups like the reduced form,
it was used in its original form. Hence, the simulation outcomes with the heuristic-switching
model are deterministic.
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• When fitting an adaptive rule to subjects’ data, the gain coe cient di↵ers considerably
between the structural and the reduced form. Thus I allow the following parameters to
di↵er across setups: the adaptive-rule coe cient in the heuristic-switching model and re-
inforcement (structural form: 0.3; reduced form: 0.65), the gain in constant gain learning
(structural form: 0.11; reduced form: 0.80) as well as the gain parameters in noisy learning
(structural form:   = 0.20, ! = 0.62; reduced form:   = 0.71, ! = 0.23.) Conceptually,
the setup-varying gain is defensible, since in a setup, where the same outcome needs to be
forecast, there is a stronger coordination motive so that making strong adjustments in the
direction of the forecast error is sensible. In the structural form, however, as subjects are
informed that their forecasts have a direct impact on their outcomes, it is reasonable to make
cautious adjustments.33 Rather than endogenizing the gain, this simplistic specification has
the advantage that it keeps the model tractable. Furthermore, appendix 9.6 shows that an
endogenizing the gain makes a low marginal contribution.
Figure 11 and tables 10 and 11 report the average results for 6,000 repeated simulations.
Reduced form:  ⇡ = 1.5 all periods
Measures Experiment HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
MSE: v¯ 0.00 0.81 0.64 0.61 0.31 0.88
MSE: inflation 0.00 0.64 1.77 0.71 0.34 0.99
Standard deviation: v¯ 0.68 0.94 0.61 0.57 0.65 1.05
Standard deviation: inflation 1.05 1.10 0.82 1.12 0.96 1.31
Mean: v¯ -0.09 -0.31 -1.04 -0.18 -0.27 -0.34
Mean: inflation 2.51 2.22 3.40 2.23 2.31 2.31
Mean squared distance from REE: v¯ 0.47 0.93 1.82 0.39 0.53 1.43
Mean squared distance from REE: ⇡ 1.35 0.42 1.89 0.32 0.21 1.06
Table 10: Measures all periods
9.3 Adaptive learning
9.3.1 Least square learning
In specifying the functional form or Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of agents’ regression, I follow
the standard in the adaptive learning literature by assuming that this functional form corresponds
33Given that the structural form is a more sophisticated experimental game than the reduced form and may
thus be closer to reality, the hypothesis that the gain is smaller in the structural than in the reduced form can
also be supported by the fact that the empirical learning literature based on surveyed expectation data and real
macroeconomic data also finds small gains. See for example Orphanides and Williams (2005a),Orphanides and
Williams (2005b),Milani (2007),Orphanides and Williams (2007) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010).
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HSM (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012)






























Least square learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)






























Constant gain learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)






























































Figure 11: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 6,000
replications) aggregated outcomes
to the functional form of the REE. Hence I assume that the PLM is a constant so that the least
square forecast of agents for period t+1 corresponds to the sample mean of the past observed
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Reduced form:  ⇡ = 1.5 periods 30-50
Measures Experiment HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
MSE: v¯ 0.00 0.58 0.46 0.03 0.09 0.06
MSE: inflation 0.00 0.23 1.14 0.02 0.04 0.02
Standard deviation: v¯ 0.12 0.61 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.19
Standard deviation: inflation 0.07 0.47 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.13
Mean: v¯ -0.09 -0.30 -1.35 -0.01 -0.21 0.07
Mean: inflation 2.11 2.04 2.87 2.00 2.03 2.02
Mean squared distance from REE: v¯ 0.03 0.53 2.18 0.00 0.11 0.07
Mean squared distance from REE: ⇡ 0.02 0.23 0.85 0.00 0.03 0.03
Table 11: Measures from period 30 to 50
values of this variable up to period t-1:
Eit v¯
i











t + (t  1) 1(v¯it 1   Eit 1v¯it) (83)
Similar to the simulation with the heuristic-switching model, I base the simulation on the two
initial values of the outcomes v¯it, p
⇤j
t and the submitted forecasts that generated these outcomes.
From period 3, expectations and the corresponding outcomes are generated by least square learn-
ing. Figure 12, showing the outcomes for aggregate v¯ and p⇤ respectively simulated by least square
learning, indicates that least square learning outperforms the heuristic-switching model in predict-
ing the di↵erent convergence patterns on average between Treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5) and Treatment
3 ( ⇡ = 3.0.)
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Least square learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)


































Least square learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)


































Least square learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)
Figure 12: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 6,000
replications) aggregated outcomes using least squares
9.3.2 Constant gain learning
A similar learning mechanism to recursive least square learning is constant gain learning, which
geometrically discounts old observations instead of attaching equal weight to all observations.
This mechanism can be viewed as approximately optimal, if agents suspect living in an unstable
environment with parameter drift as shown by Evans et al. (2010). The updating equation, which









t 1   Eit 1v¯it) (84)
Assuming that the learning parameter   is stable across subjects and treatments yields an estimate
of 0.11.
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Figure 13, depicting the simulations of the constant-gain model with these estimates, shows that
the constant gain version also predicts the di↵erence between treatment 2 ( ⇡ = 1.5) and treatment
3 ( ⇡ = 3).


































Constant gain learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)


































Constant gain learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)


































Constant gain learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)
Figure 13: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 6,000
replications) aggregated outcomes using constant gain
9.4 Heuristic-switching model
9.4.1 Simulation
The simulations are initialized by two initial values of the outcomes v¯it, p
⇤j
t respectively and initial
weights nit,h which have been set to 0.25 for each subject and each heuristic h. With the initial
values and the initial weights, the outcomes in periods 3 and 4 can be computed. From period 5,
each individual expectation and outcomes is fully determined by the simulations. For the starting
values of each experimental group, 6,000 replications of the simulation have been conducted.
60
For each replication the median outcomes and other the other interesting statistics have been
calculated and subsequently averaged. Finally, I average over all experimental groups. Figure 14
depicts the averages of aggregate v¯ and p⇤ over 6,000 simulation replications for each group.


































HSM (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012)


































HSM (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012)


































HSM (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012)
Figure 14: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (mean over 2000












































































































































Figure 15: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (one replication)
aggregated outcomes using reinforcement
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9.5.2 Noisy learning








































































































































Figure 16: Actual (mean over all experimental groups) outcomes and simulated (one replication)
aggregated outcomes using noisy learning
9.6 Endogenous gain
An intriguing question is whether other gain algorithms than constant gain improve the fit of
noisy adaptive learning to the experimental data. I consider both decreasing gain and a more
sophisticated endogenous gain algorithm by Marcet and Nicolini (2003).
9.6.1 Decreasing gain
A plausible mechanism is a gain of (t  1) 1, which could be interpreted as subjects making high
adjustments at the beginning of the experiment, which are, however, decreasing, as subjects gain
more experience. Under this mechanism, the only parameter that needs to be estimated, the
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variance coe cient, is given by approximately ! = 0.59 for both the structural form and the
reduced form.
9.6.2 Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) relate the gain to the past observed forecast errors, which is, however, at
the expense of tractability. Since subjects directly observe the profit as a non-linear transformation

















where h denotes the number of periods since the last switch to decreasing gain, J is the window
length of past forecast errors considered,   is an arbitrary cuto↵ point and  ¯ is the threshold gain
once subjects switch to a constant gain algorithm. Milani (2014) assumes that   is endogenously









so that subjects have a certain window length of their profits as a benchmark. Estimating the
parameters of noisy learning with endogenous gain using maximum likelihood gives  ¯ = 0.40,
! = 0.50, J=1 and W=8.
Table 12, reporting the mean square errors, shows that decreasing gain considerably worsens the
fit, while the fit with the endogenous gain leads to similar results to the constant gain case. The














RF  ⇡ = 1.5 SF  ⇡ = 0.5 SF  ⇡ = 1.5 SF  ⇡ = 3
v ⇡ v p⇤ v p* v p*
HSM 0.81 0.64 366507.77 554832.90 8.43 20.90 0.83 1.05
OLS 0.64 1.77 264495.34 504139.91 8.73 28.52 1.70 0.85
CG 0.61 0.71 263375.30 501560.52 9.39 26.15 1.51 1.17
Reinforcement 0.31 0.34 149720.10 305299.15 7.68 18.29 0.71 1.02
Noisy
baseline 0.88 0.99 271734.30 517709.31 7.25 18.21 1.24 1.92
decreasing gain 1.28 5.92 276021.28 572200.71 8.90 28.28 1.30 1.38
endogenous gain 1.08 0.90 245060.72 461194.02 8.26 19.22 0.97 1.02
Table 12: Mean square error
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9.7 Tables for all learning models
9.7.1 All periods
 ⇡ = 0.5
Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 366507.77 264495.34 263375.30 149720.10 271734.30
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 554832.90 504139.91 501560.52 305299.15 517709.31
Mean: v¯ 377.43 557.42 5.98 7.13 485.33 8.59
Mean: p⇤ 562.20 765.16 11.12 12.90 725.75 15.41
MSD from REE: v¯ 268390.11 630093.47 50.17 86.13 443216.51 129.21
MSD from REE: p⇤ 514324.42 1123272.73 111.03 200.23 925942.38 290.86
Standard deviation: v¯ 311.47 501.38 0.74 1.87 402.38 6.03
Standard deviation: p⇤ 434.66 649.56 0.91 2.57 569.56 8.60
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 374015.88 338145.43 336897.40 142536.97 347077.80
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 558014.57 495119.52 492527.53 310652.46 508485.47
MSD from REE: v¯i 343486.43 614143.10 84.83 122.22 674365.20 243.48
MSD from REE: p⇤j 505904.75 1120158.18 132.25 225.95 1320941.26 239.52
Dispersion of v¯i 278.19 78.59 4.91 4.91 219.71 14.54
Dispersion of p⇤j 160.10 22.67 2.98 3.20 42.83 5.81
Table 13: All periods for  ⇡ = 0.5
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 ⇡ = 1.5
Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 8.43 8.73 9.39 7.68 7.25
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 20.90 28.52 26.15 18.29 18.21
Mean: v¯ 1.32 0.13 1.29 1.38 0.16 1.18
Mean: p⇤ 5.05 3.37 7.29 7.00 3.34 6.40
MSD from REE: v¯ 8.58 1.67 4.22 5.62 1634.55 5.34
MSD from REE: p⇤ 23.26 6.41 35.31 31.96 4376.35 24.57
Standard deviation: v¯ 2.41 1.11 0.55 0.83 1.68 1.74
Standard deviation: p⇤ 3.19 1.98 0.62 1.15 2.67 1.79
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 7399.52 7025.04 7020.54 5068.70 7370.78
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 26.62 36.21 36.48 25.13 29.04
MSD from REE: v¯i 7152.72 52.25 39.43 40.91 82.78 109.26
MSD from REE: p⇤j 34.08 13.90 48.58 49.00 11.19 28.12
Dispersion of v¯i 45.67 6.54 6.32 6.31 25.24 8.91
Dispersion of p⇤j 2.92 1.37 2.65 2.85 1.65 3.21
Table 14: All periods for  ⇡ = 1.5
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 ⇡ = 3.0
Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 0.83 1.70 1.51 0.71 1.24
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 1.05 0.85 1.17 1.02 1.92
Mean: v¯ 0.26 -0.08 -0.69 -0.50 -0.02 -0.17
Mean: p⇤ 2.72 2.17 2.51 2.74 2.19 3.32
MSD from REE: v¯ 0.75 0.10 0.68 0.54 1.22 1.86
MSD from REE: p⇤ 1.70 0.20 0.57 1.39 2.47 4.08
Standard deviation: v¯ 0.71 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.69 1.27
Standard deviation: p⇤ 0.99 0.82 0.87 1.08 1.03 1.50
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 8392.21 8013.70 8013.99 5895.72 8408.16
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 5.98 8.82 10.55 5.85 11.40
MSD from REE: v¯i 8060.09 58.66 18.97 18.91 19.90 28.80
MSD from REE: p⇤j 11.05 6.42 11.85 16.17 2.75 13.18
Dispersion of v¯i 31.93 6.84 4.63 4.63 18.92 7.54
Dispersion of p⇤j 1.86 1.20 2.68 2.87 1.26 2.91




Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 526997.96 337958.89 334816.45 201402.64 330359.47
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 689847.60 573762.16 566104.17 383002.42 558448.10
Mean: v¯ 494.84 1050.05 7.39 11.05 847.00 13.59
Mean: p⇤ 707.07 1389.42 13.41 19.26 1247.83 23.33
MSD from REE: v¯ 343633.59 1287328.10 71.82 167.91 847755.38 255.30
MSD from REE: p⇤ 588244.14 2216424.87 164.33 403.35 1735919.83 583.50
Standard deviation: v¯ 241.03 119.60 0.41 0.00 196.44 5.40
Standard deviation: p⇤ 272.92 122.23 0.47 3.07 188.03 6.79
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 507459.91 436485.68 432934.86 176738.81 426851.90
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 714967.94 600927.47 593556.64 400773.41 586213.54
MSD from REE: v¯i 444173.06 1235593.52 106.63 207.08 823199.31 689.85
MSD from REE: p⇤j 616582.76 2211486.29 177.38 413.63 1713221.67 634.34
Dispersion of v¯i 360.54 94.59 4.79 4.74 299.81 15.87
Dispersion of p⇤j 221.88 12.41 2.20 1.60 46.21 6.02
Table 16: Periods 30-50
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 ⇡ = 1.5
Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 7.98 9.38 8.60 8.26 7.28
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 20.08 30.27 24.85 20.25 14.71
Mean: v¯ 1.03 -0.21 0.73 0.24 -0.39 0.21
Mean: p⇤ 4.89 2.33 6.69 5.61 2.01 5.16
MSD from REE: v¯ 7.43 1.28 2.13 0.91 3887.46 2.50
MSD from REE: p⇤ 21.57 2.13 31.00 20.67 10401.91 15.23
Standard deviation: v¯ 2.08 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.99 1.14
Standard deviation: p⇤ 2.69 0.42 0.15 0.62 1.42 1.11
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 2733.86 2697.88 2707.14 2926.50 2693.71
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 24.61 35.19 28.59 25.59 19.16
MSD from REE: v¯i 2734.91 47.30 35.52 33.76 9610.66 102.91
MSD from REE: p⇤j 27.13 2.66 36.03 23.25 10307.62 23.00
Dispersion of v¯i 35.15 6.20 6.25 6.18 27.24 8.84
Dispersion of p⇤j 2.29 0.62 1.97 1.43 1.08 1.99
Table 17: Periods 30-50
70
 ⇡ = 3.0
Measures Data HSM OLS CG Reinforcement Noisy
Aggregates
MSE: v¯ 0.00 0.34 1.01 0.70 0.32 0.84
MSE: p⇤ 0.00 0.55 0.66 0.73 0.59 0.43
Mean: v¯ 0.10 -0.06 -0.69 -0.46 -0.05 -0.54
Mean: p⇤ 2.37 1.99 2.02 1.85 1.97 2.20
MSD from REE: v¯ 0.31 0.03 0.53 0.26 2.04 1.08
MSD from REE: p⇤ 0.55 0.02 0.11 0.09 4.65 0.69
Standard deviation: v¯ 0.50 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.70
Standard deviation: p⇤ 0.49 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.38 0.60
Individuals
MSE: v¯i 0.00 2384.65 2388.01 2387.24 2239.73 2415.66
MSE: p⇤j 0.00 2.35 6.79 4.80 2.51 3.99
MSD from REE: v¯i 2408.98 27.34 18.33 17.87 20902.58 85.68
MSD from REE: p⇤j 2.55 0.17 5.21 2.90 5.88 4.35
Dispersion of v¯i 17.97 5.00 4.58 4.54 25.59 7.18
Dispersion of p⇤j 1.00 0.31 1.99 1.45 0.52 1.64
Table 18: Periods 30-50
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